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Abstract: 
We study the implications of product market competition and investment for price 
setting, wage bargaining and thereby for equilibrium unemployment in an economy 
with product and labour market imperfections. We show that intensified product market 
competition will reduce equilibrium unemployment, whereas the effect of increased 
capital intensity is more complex. Higher capital intensity will decrease the equilibrium 
unemployment when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is less than 
one, while the reverse happens when this elasticity is higher than one but smaller than 
the elasticity of substitution between products. Finally, we demonstrate how labour and 
product market imperfections, characterized by the wage and price setting mark-ups, 
affect the optimal capital stock. Our findings raise important questions for future 
empirical research. 
 
Keywords: equilibrium unemployment, product market imperfections, investment, wage 
bargaining. 
JEL classification: E22, E24, J51, L11. 
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I.  Introduction 
We analyze the interaction between labour and product market imperfections as well 
as the role of investment behaviour – affected by capital markets – from the point of 
view of equilibrium unemployment. Our study fulfils a twofold purpose. Firstly, we 
explore the impact of long-term investments on wage formation, and thereby on 
unemployment, in an economy characterized by labour and product market 
imperfections. Secondly, we investigate the consequences of imperfections in the 
product market on equilibrium unemployment. In fact, we will design a theoretical 
model, which demonstrates that there are important interaction effects between 
labour market imperfections, product market imperfections and long-term 
investments and that these effects have implications for equilibrium unemployment. 
Finally, we explore how labour and product market imperfections affect the optimal 
capital stock. 
The employment consequences of long-term investments have for a long time 
been a controversial issue in economics and this issue seems to underlie many 
disputes between firm owners and labour unions. In conventional models of 
imperfectly competitive labour markets - a la´ Layard and Nickell and Jackmann 
(1991) – the investment behaviour has no effect on equilibrium unemployment. This 
is due to the specification of a Cobb-Douglas production function, which implies a 
constant wage elasticity of labour demand. Hence, investments or interest rate 
fluctuations will have no effect on the wage determination, achieved through wage 
negotiations due to the constant wage elasticity, and therefore no effect on 
equilibrium unemployment.  
Many reservations can be raised against the Cobb-Douglas specification. The 
Cobb-Douglas specification does not seem to lie in conformity with empirics (see 
e.g. Lucas (1969), Rowthorn (1995), (1999) and Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000)). 
Furthermore, it has also been argued that when trying to explain variations in the 
labour share there is a need to depart from the usual assumption of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function (see Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2002)). Moreover, and related, 
medium- to long-term changes in unemployment appear to be correlated with 
medium- to long-term changes in private investment – a feature which does not seem 
to be consistent with predictions generated by models with Cobb-Douglas production 
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functions (see Blanchard (1997) and, for some empirics, e.g. Herbertsson and Zoega 
(2002)). On the theoretical side Phelps (1994) has argued, applying an intertemporal 
customer market model, that higher real interest rates will raise the mark-ups in the 
product markets, leading to higher equilibrium unemployment. In the present paper 
we abandon the Cobb-Douglas specification and introduce a link between the long-
term investment decisions and the negotiated wages by focusing on a more general 
class of CES production functions.  
The employment consequences of intensified competition and deregulation in 
product markets have been analyzed to some extent in the recent literature. However, 
in this literature the potential role of investments has been abstracted away by 
postulating a production function with labour as the only production factor either in a 
linear (see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Ebell and Haefke (2003)) or Cobb-
Douglas form (see Spector (2004)). In what follows we extend the approach applied 
in these models by focusing on a general class of CES production functions within a 
framework where we capture the imperfections in product markets through 
monopolistic competition and those of the labour markets through a ‘right-to-
manage’ union bargaining model. In particular, we incorporate the general CES-type 
production function with capital and labour inputs in such a way that the elasticity of 
substitution between the production factors will depend on the capital-labour ratio.1 
In the present analysis we show that while intensified product market 
competition will decrease equilibrium unemployment, the effect of capital intensity 
is more complex. Higher capital intensity will moderate the negotiated wage rate and 
thereby reduce equilibrium unemployment when the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour is less than one. However, a higher capital intensity will 
have reverse effects when the elasticity of substitution is higher than one but smaller 
than the price elasticity of demand in the product market. Our analysis further 
verifies that the relationship between the capital stock and equilibrium 
unemployment would vanish in the special case of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. Finally, we explore the determination of the optimal capital stock in the 
                                                 
1 Hoon (1998) has developed a model with a different focus to study the interactions of unemployment 
and economic growth by assuming that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is 
less than one under the efficiency wage hypothesis. 
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presence of product and labour market imperfections. Our new theoretical findings 
provide an important topic for empirical research. 
We proceed as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of the model as 
well as the time sequence of decisions. Price setting and labour demand by firms are 
studied in section III. In section IV we analyze the wage determination through Nash 
bargaining. Section V explores the determinants of equilibrium unemployment. In 
section VI we investigate investment decisions under labour and product market 
imperfections. Finally, in section VII we present concluding comments. 
II.  Basic Framework  
We focus on a model with product and labour market imperfections. In the long run, 
at stage 1, firms commit themselves to their investment programs, which determine 
the capital stocks. The investment decisions are made in anticipation of their effects 
on wage setting, price setting and labour demand. At stage 2 there is wage 
negotiation between firms and labour unions and at this stage the firms are 
committed to their investments.2 The wage negotiations take place in anticipation of 
the consequences for labour demand and price setting. Finally, at stage 3 firms make 
employment decisions and set prices by taking the negotiated wage rate and 
investment decision as given.  
We summarize the time sequence of decisions in Figure 1. In the subsequent 
sections we derive the decisions taking place at different stages by using backward 
induction. 
  Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3 
           time 
          
capital stock  wage   labour demand 
  decision  bargaining  price setting 
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions 
                                                 
2 This timing structure captures the idea of long-term investment decisions, which are inflexible at the 
stage when the wage negotiations are undertaken. Such a timing structure seems plausible when the 
investments represent, for example, irreversible technology choices.  
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We postulate (for each firm i ) a CES production function of the type  
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iiiii aLKaLKR , i = 1,…,n   (1a) 
where iK  denotes firm i’s capital stock, iL  is the amount of labour, and a  and σ are 
parameters satisfying 0 < a < 1 and σ > 0, respectively. The parameter a is often 
called the distribution parameter (see e.g. Arrow at al (1961)), while σ captures the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. As we will see, this production 
function opens up a rich and interesting relationship between the capital stock and 
equilibrium unemployment. For reasons of comparison we also repeatedly consider 
the conventional case of Cobb-Douglas production function 
a
i
a
iiii LKLKR
−= 1),( ,  i = 1,…,n     (1b) 
where the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is equal to one. Notice 
that in (1b) the parameter a defines the labour share of production. 
III.  Price Setting and Labour Demand 
The product market is modelled to operate with monopolistic competition a la´ Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977) and the firms face consumers endowed with the following CES- 
utility function 
1
1
1
1 −
=
−− 
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= ∑ s
s
n
i
s
s
iDnU s ,        (2) 
where s denotes the elasticity of substitution between products. This elasticity could 
be thought of as an increasing function of the number of products offered according 
to 1)( >= ngss , where sng ,0)(' >  is a constant and n  is the number of products 
(and firms). In the short run the number of firms is fixed so that s is given, while in 
the long run there is free entry of new firms so that s is determined endogenously 
(see e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)). We take this elasticity of substitution (and 
thereby the number of products offered) as the measure of the degree of product 
market competition. A higher elasticity of substitution means a higher degree of 
product market competition and the limiting case of perfect competition is associated 
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with the elasticity of substitution s  tending to infinity. The utility function in (2) has 
the special feature that an increase in the number of products does not increase utility 
directly. Technically, this due to the presence of sn
1−  in the square brackets in (2). 
However, the increase of the number of products increases the elasticity of 
substitution between products, and thus the elasticity of demand facing firms (for 
more discussion and motivation see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003, p. 882)). 
A firm i  decides on price and employment so as to maximize the following 
profit function 
{ iiiiiii
Lp
LwLKRp
ii
−= ),(max
,
π  .     (3) 
At this stage the firm takes the negotiated wage rate iw  and the capital stock iK  as 
given. From the underlying utility functions of the consumers, given by (2), the 
demand in the product market can be seen to be of the form  
s
i
i P
p
P
MD
−


= ,        (4) 
where ip  is the price of good i , 
sn
i
s
ipn
P
−
=
− 

 ∑≡ 1
1
1
11  is the index of the aggregate 
price level, M  is the aggregate nominal income and 1>s  is the elasticity of 
substitution between different products. Thus, M/P denotes the real income. In 
Appendix A we derive the demand function (4) from the CES-utility function (2)3. 
Furthermore, if we assume that the rents from capital are competed away in the long 
run, the aggregate nominal income is 
[ ]BuwuNM +−= )1( ,       (5) 
where N denotes the number of individuals in the economy, u is the unemployment 
rate, w is the negotiated wage rate and B is the unemployment compensation. It is 
important to point out that at this stage of the game the aggregate nominal income 
M  is exogenous, but later on both the wage rate w  and the unemployment rate u  
are endogenized. 
                                                 
3 See also Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).  
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We can rewrite the CES production function (1a) as 
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By imposing market-clearing in the product markets, ii RD = , and by using (6) we 
can re-express the profit function (3) for the purpose of price setting according to 
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where iKPM ,,  and iw  are taken as given.  
The necessary first-order condition associated with (7) can be expressed as 
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We can reformulate (8) according to the equation 
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By imposing the symmetry condition Ppi =  for all i (9) can be simplified according 
to the following price-setting rule 
1
1
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where 
1
)( −= s
ssµ , with 0)(' <sµ , is the mark-up factor associated with the pricing 
equilibrium. This mark-up factor depends negatively on the elasticity of substitution 
between products. From equation (10a) and using the definition of the aggregate 
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nominal income, M in (5), we can attach the following qualitative properties to the 
price setting: 
0,0,0 >∂
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In the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function (1b) we can use a similar 
procedure to find the following price setting rule 
a
i
a
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i swK
Map ))((
1
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µσ
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−
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
=  for all i     (10b) 
As one can see the qualitative properties of (10b) are similar to those of (10a). 
We can now summarize our characterization of the optimal price setting by 
firms in 
Proposition 1 Higher wage rates, higher unemployment compensations or lower 
elasticities of substitution between products will all raise the equilibrium price in the 
product market, whereas higher unemployment rates or higher capital stocks will 
decrease it, ceteris paribus. 
The pass-through effects - characterized in Proposition 1 - seem to appeal to 
intuition and several of these features are well known from the literature. An 
important new aspect in Proposition 1 is the role of the capital stock for the price 
setting. This aspect has been neglected in the earlier literature (see Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2003), Ebell and Haefke (2003) and Spector (2004), where either linear or 
Cobb-Douglas production functions with labour being the only input were 
considered). An increase in the capital stock will increase production and thereby 
induce lower prices, ceteris paribus. This provides an alternative argument for the 
result by Phelps (1994) according to which lower interest rates will decrease the 
mark-up in the product markets. 
In order to simplify notation we from now on mostly abstract from the firm-
specific index associated with product .i  Doing so the necessary first-order condition 
determining labour demand can be written as  
0=−= wpRLLπ         (12) 
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with the associated second-order condition .0<+= LLLLLL RppRπ  Using the CES 
production function (1a) the first-order condition (12) can be expressed as 
p
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with 0>KL  and .0)/( <pwL  In the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function 
(1b) using a similar procedure we end up with the labour demand  
a
ap
wKL
−−
= 

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= 1
1
1σ         (13b) 
with 0>KL and 0)/( <pwL  as well. Notice that in the formulations of the labour 
demand functions in (13a) and (13b) the product price is endogenous as it implicitly 
depends on the wage rate.  
The wage elasticity of labour demand, which turns out to be important later on, 
can be written in the case of the CES production function (1a) as (see Appendix B) 
σ
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σ σ
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1 1
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while the Cobb-Douglas production function leads to 
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where .)(/)1( 1−=− sss µ  From (14a) we can conclude that the wage elasticity of 
labour demand depends on the following four factors: the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour (σ ), the degree of competition in the product markets 
( s ), the capital-labour ratio ( LKk /≡ ) and the distribution parameter .a  We 
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observe that intensified product market competition, measured by higher elasticity of 
substitution between the products, increases the wage elasticity of labour demand, 
i.e. .0>sη  It is natural that more intense product market competition makes it 
harder for the firms to survive with higher wages and thus increased competition 
makes the firms’ employment decisions more sensitive to changes in the wage rate. 
This feature holds true also in the case of Cobb-Douglas production function (see 
equation (14b)).4 When we approach a situation with perfect competition in the 
product markets (i.e., as ∞→s ) the wage elasticity of labour demand converges to 




−+
−
σ
σ
σ
1
1
1 k
a
a , which reduces to 1/(1 - a) in the Cobb-Douglas case. 
Next we ask, what is the effect of the capital-labour ratio k  on the wage 
elasticity of labour demand? This is an interesting question because, for example, the 
competitiveness of the capital markets and thereby the size of the capital stock will 
affect the capital intensity .k  Differentiating (14a) with respect to k  yields 
21
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where .1>s  The comparative static effects of the capital intensity, ,k  on the wage 
elasticity of labour demand are illustrated in the ),( sσ -space in Figure 2. In this 
respect we can report the following findings: (i) Under gross complementarity 
between capital and labour )1( <σ  higher capital intensity increases the wage 
elasticity of labour demand. (ii) The same happens under gross substitutability 
)1( >σ  as long as the elasticity of substitution between products ( s ) is lower than 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the production function. 
(iii) Under gross substitutability )1( >σ  the wage elasticity is a decreasing function 
                                                 
4 There is empirical evidence according to which product market regulation has decreased and 
thereby competition increased in OECD countries during the 1990s (for evidence, see Nicoletti, 
Bassanini, Ernst, Jean, Santiago and Swaim (2001)). Gersbach (2000) summarizes three mechanisms 
(lower markups, higher total factor productivity and expanded sets of product varieties), through 
which reductions in product market imperfections might enhance employment. Blanchard and 
Philippon (2003) design a “minimalist model” to explore the effects of intensified product market 
competition when labour unions learn slowly about structural changes in the economic environment 
and when trust plays an important role in the labour market.  
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of the capital intensity if the elasticity of substitution between products ( s ) is higher 
than the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the production 
function. We can explain these relationships by reference to the following 
interpretations: While under gross substitutability, ceteris paribus, a higher capital 
intensity reduces the wage elasticity of labour demand, a higher capital stock will 
decrease the price mark-up and therefore has the reverse effect on the wage 
elasticity. The latter effect dominates when σ>s  whereas the former effect 
dominates if σ<s . In this latter case a higher capital intensity will increase the 
wage elasticity of labour demand even though capital and labour are gross 
substitutes. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
σ
s
ηk<0ηk>0
ηk>0
 
Figure 2: The effect of the capital-labour ratio on the wage elasticity of labour 
demand 
We can summarize our findings in 
Proposition 2 Intensified product market competition will always increase wage 
elasticity of labour demand. A higher capital intensity will increase the wage 
elasticity of labour demand when the elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital is less than one or when it is higher than one but smaller than the elasticity of 
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substitution between products. But, if the elasticity of substitution between the 
production factors is higher than the elasticity of substitution between the products, 
an increase in capital intensity will decrease the wage elasticity. 
From Proposition 2 we can conclude that the technological elasticity of 
substitution between the production factors is of primary importance for the 
relationship between capital intensity and the wage elasticity of labour demand. 
Basically, the wage elasticity of labour demand is an increasing function of the 
capital intensity except for such a case of technological gross substitutability where 
an offsetting effect with reduced price mark-ups is sufficiently strong. Such an 
offsetting effect is sufficiently strong precisely when the degree of product market 
competition is high.  
Finally, (14b) reveals the following result in the Cobb-Douglas case 
Corollary 1: The wage elasticity of labour demand is independent of the capital 
intensity in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Corollary 1 verifies the conventional assumption, whereby there is no 
relationship between wage elasticity and investment under circumstances with Cobb-
Douglas production functions. Thus, this type of production function eliminates the 
potential channel through which credit market behaviour might impact on wage 
elasticity via the determination of the capital stock.  
IV. Wage Determination via Nash Bargaining  
We now turn to look at the stage of wage determination by taking the capital stock 
K  as given. We apply the Nash bargaining solution within the context of the ‘right-
to-manage’ approach according to which employment is unilaterally determined by 
the firms. The wage bargaining takes place in anticipation of optimal price and 
employment decisions by the firms. Following the Nash bargaining approach the 
firm and the labour union negotiate with respect to the wage so as to solve the 
optimization problem    
{ [ ] [ ] ββ −−−=Ω 1*** ),()(max wLLKpRbwL
w
 so that 0=Lπ  and 0=pπ  (16) 
  13
where the relative bargaining power of the union is β  and that of the firm is )1( β− , 
EUbwL =− )(* , b  is the (exogenous) outside option available to union members 
and wLLKpR −= ),(π . The outside options for the firm and the union are 
Ko ∆−=π  and MbU o = , respectively, where M  is the number of labour union 
members and r+=∆ 1  denotes the cost of capital. Under these assumptions the 
necessary first-order condition for the wage determination can be written as 
0)1( =−+ π
πββ ww
U
U
       (17) 
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Substituting the expressions (18a) and (18b) into the first-order condition (17) yields, 
after some rearrangement, the following Nash bargaining solutions for the wage rate 
in the case of CES (1a) and Cobb-Douglas (1b) production functions   
b
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According to (19a) and (19b) the negotiated wage rate depends positively on the 
outside option (b ) and on the relative bargaining power of the labour union ( β ), 
while negatively on wage elasticity of labour demand (η ). As we described in 
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Proposition 2, the wage elasticity of labour demand depends positively on product 
market competition ( s ). Further, the relationship between the wage elasticity of 
demand (η ) and the capital-labour ratio ( k ) depends on the size of the elasticity of 
substitution (σ ) between capital and labour in the production function as well as on 
the relative sizes of σ  and s . In particular, as we approach perfect product market 
competition with ∞→s  in the Cobb-Douglas case, the wage rate converges towards 
[ ] [ ]bbaa )1/(1/)1(1 −+=−+ ηββ , where η = 1/(1-a) is the wage elasticity of labour 
demand under perfect product market competition. 
Differentiating the wage rate (19a) with respect to the capital-labour ratio gives 
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Expression (20) characterizes the capital stock as a strategic commitment device. We 
can delineate the outcome (20) as follows: First, under gross complementarity 
between capital and labour ( 1<σ ) higher capital intensity decreases the negotiated 
wage rate via two channels: (1) it becomes harder for the union to extract rent in 
negotiations because of higher wage elasticity of labour demand, and (2) a higher 
capital-labor ratio increases the negative effect of the wage rate on the profit, i.e. 
0<


∂
∂
π
πw
k
 when )1( <σ  and thus moderates wage formation. Second, the reverse 
happens under gross substitutability )1( >σ  if the elasticity of substitution is smaller 
than the price elasticity of product demand. The interpretation of this finding is 
analogous to the former case. Finally, if under gross substitutability ( 1>σ ) the price 
elasticity of product demand is smaller than the elasticity of substitution, the effect of 
capital intensity on wage determination is a priori ambiguous and it depends on the 
relative bargaining power of labour union, the level of capital intensity, the degree of 
product market competition, and the value of the distribution parameter. In 
particular, one can see from (20) that in the case σ<< s1  we have 
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Figure 3 illustrates the effect of the capital intensity on the negotiated wage in 
the ),( sσ - space for different values of the relative bargaining power of the labour 
union. We observe that an increased capital intensity induces wage moderation for 
combinations with sufficiently high elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour and a sufficiently low degree of competition in the product market, measured 
by the elasticity of substitution between products. On the other hand, a sufficiently 
strong intensification of competition in the product market will change this 
relationship. Hence, with a reasonably moderate elasticity of substitution between the 
production factors sufficiently intense product market competition will lead to a 
relationship whereby the negotiated wage rate increases as a function of the capital 
intensity. From Figure 3 we can also infer that the region characterized by wage 
moderation is increasing as a function of the bargaining power of the labour union. 
This means that the capital intensity provides a stronger strategic commitment device 
for the generation of wage moderation the larger is the labour market imperfections 
characterized by the bargaining power of the labour unions.5 Figure 4 illustrates how 
the distribution parameter a  impacts on the relationship between wage formation 
and capital intensity.  
We now summarize our analysis of wage bargaining in 
Proposition 3 The negotiated wage rate depends negatively on the wage elasticity of 
labour demand and therefore intensified product market competition will decrease 
the wage rate. Higher capital intensity will decrease the negotiated wage rate if the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is smaller than one while the 
reverse happens if it is higher than one, but smaller than the price elasticity of 
product demand. But if the elasticity of substitution between the production factors 
exceeds both one and the price elasticity of substitution between products, the impact 
of capital intensity is a priori ambiguous.  
                                                 
5 This feature reminds of the wage-moderating effect of profit sharing on the negotiated base wage. As 
Koskela and Stenbacka (2003) demonstrate, the wage-moderating effect of profit sharing is stronger 
the larger are the imperfections in the labour market.  
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Figure 3: The effect of the capital-labor ratio on the wage rate with different 
values of the labour union’s bargaining power  
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Figure 4: The effect of the capital-labor ratio on the wage rate with different 
distribution parameter values 
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Finally, if the production function is Cobb-Douglas we can replicate the Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman (1991) finding according to which the capital stock does not 
affect wage formation.6 
Corollary 2 With a Cobb-Douglas production function capital intensity will have no 
effect on the negotiated wage. 
From the negotiated Nash wage we get interesting special cases. If all the 
bargaining power lies with the union ( 1=β ), the Nash bargaining solution is 
simplified to the monopoly union solution 
b
sk
skwM
1),(
),(
1 −=≠ η
η
σ   and  bs
swM
1)(
)(
1 −== η
η
σ     (20’) 
according to which the wage mark-up depends negatively on the wage elasticity of 
labour demand which is a function of the capital-labour ratio k  when 1≠σ  while it 
is not when 1=σ . Further the wage elasticity of labour demand is an increasing 
function of the price elasticity of product demand .s   
If all the bargaining power lies with the firm ( 0=β ), the relationship between 
the negotiated wage and the capital intensity disappears. In this case the negotiated 
wage converges to the competitive wage with bwC = , i.e. the wage mark-up is 
eroded. Intuitively this seems to make sense for the following reason. The capital 
intensity serves as a strategic commitment device, which will affect the distribution 
of the rents achieved through bargaining, in imperfectly competitive labour markets.7 
Once the labour market imperfections are eroded the capital intensity can no longer 
play such a strategic role.  
There is empirical evidence according to which higher product market 
competition will moderate wage formation. See e.g. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) 
using Canadian data, Nickell and Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1994) using data from 
                                                 
6 It is interesting to observe that wages are assumed to always depend positively on the capital 
intensity in Denny and Nickell (1992). As (20) makes clear this is far from self-evident.  
7 In other contexts both the capital structure and the compensation scheme have been shown to 
constitute a similar type of commitment device (see e.g. Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) and Koskela 
and Stenbacka (2004)). 
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British manufacturing companies and Neven and Röller and Zhang (1999), who have 
used the data from eight European airline companies to analyze links between 
product market competition and union power. Nickell (1999) presents a survey of 
this literature. 
V.  Product Markets, Capital Intensity and Equilibrium 
Unemployment 
Above we have characterized wage formation, labour demand and price setting from 
a partial equilibrium perspective. We now move on to explore the determinants of 
equilibrium unemployment in a general equilibrium framework. We are particularly 
interested in the relationships between capital stock, and thereby the capital intensity, 
the intensity of competition in the product market and the equilibrium 
unemployment.  
According to (19a) and (19b) the negotiated wage rate in industry i  is of the 
form bAw i
N
i = , where the mark-up factors in the cases of CES- and Cobb-Douglas 
production functions 
σ
σσ
βηβ
β
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ask
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and 
a
as
A
−−+−
+==
1
)1()1)((
1
1 βηβ
β
σ      (22b) 
are, in principle, industry-specific. We impose symmetry assumptions meaning that 
AAi =  and NNi ww = for all i. In a general equilibrium the term b  should be re-
interpreted as the relevant outside option, which we specify as 
uBwub N +−= )1( ,        (23) 
where u  is the unemployment rate, B  captures the unemployment benefit and Nw  
denotes the negotiated wage rate in all identical industries. Assuming a constant 
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benefit replacement ratio NwBq =  and substituting (23) for b  into the Nash 
bargaining solutions (19a) and (19b) yields the equilibrium unemployment 


 −−= Aqu
N 11
1
1 ,        (24) 
where the wage mark-up A is given by (21a) for 1≠σ  and by (21b) for .1=σ  
According to (24) a higher benefit-replacement ratio, q , and a higher mark-up in 
the wage determination, A , will increase equilibrium unemployment. Further, from 
the mark-ups in the wage determination we can conclude that higher wage elasticity 
of labour demand will decrease equilibrium unemployment. In fact, differentiating 
(22a) with respect to s  gives 
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meaning that intensified product market competition will moderate the wage mark-
up in the general case 1≠σ . The same qualitative result holds true also in the case 
with 1=σ  as can be seen by differentiating (22b) with respect to .s  Hence, 
intensified product market competition will, ceteris paribus, decrease equilibrium 
unemployment because 0>sη  and .0<∂
∂
η
Nu  
As for the impact of the capital-labour ratio on equilibrium unemployment we 
initially observe that 
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(26) offers a characterization of the capital stock as a strategic commitment device 
with employment effects. Because it holds true that bA
k
w
k
N
k =∂
∂
, we can explore the 
effect of the capital intensity on equilibrium unemployment by combining (20) and 
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(26). The relationship between the negotiated wage and the capital intensity was 
characterized in Proposition 3. According to Proposition 3 more intense product 
market competition will, ceteris paribus, moderate the negotiated wages and thereby 
decrease equilibrium unemployment, while the relationship between capital intensity, 
wage formation and thereby the relationship between capital intensity and 
equilibrium unemployment is more complicated. More specifically, it depends on the 
size of the elasticity of substitution between production factors, on the degree of 
product market competition, measured by the price elasticity of demand as well as on 
the relative sizes of these two parameters.  
Our findings concerning the determinants of equilibrium unemployment can 
now be summarized in  
Proposition 4 Increased product market competition will reduce equilibrium 
unemployment. Higher capital intensity will reduce equilibrium unemployment when 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is smaller than one while the 
reverse happens when it is higher than one, but smaller than the price elasticity of 
product demand. But if the elasticity of substitution lies between one and the 
elasticity of substitution between the production factors (larger than one), then the 
effect of capital intensity on equilibrium unemployment is a priori ambiguous. 
According to Proposition 4 the effect of capital intensity – and thereby also the 
effect of the interest rate and thereby possibly the effect of the degree of credit 
market competition – on equilibrium unemployment depends both on the size of the 
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital and on the relationship between 
it and product market competition, measured by the price elasticity of product 
demand. Rowthorn (1999) has argued that the elasticity of substitution is smaller 
than one. Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) have used a panel of 82 countries over a 
28-year period to estimate a general CES production function specification. For the 
entire sample they reject the Cobb-Douglas specification, but for the richest group of 
countries σ  is higher than one and for the poorest group of countries lower than one. 
Finally, for the special case with a Cobb-Douglas production function we again 
reproduce the Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) finding according to which 
capital stock does not affect wage formation.  
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Corollary 3 With a Cobb-Douglas production function equilibrium unemployment is 
independent of the capital intensity.  
Our results regarding the relationship between labour market imperfections, 
product market imperfections, investments and equilibrium unemployment are 
related to a few recent research contributions. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and 
Spector (2004) have earlier theoretically studied the employment consequences of 
product market competition and deregulation within a bargaining framework. Ebell 
and Haefke (2003) apply a dynamic matching model to explore the dynamic 
relationship between product market competition and equilibrium unemployment. In 
contrast to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004), Ebell and Haefke 
(2003) make use of a Cournot model where the number of firms competing in each 
industry measures the intensity of product market competition. All these 
contributions, however, abstract from the determination of capital stock and, in 
particular, from its potential implications for employment by assuming either the 
linear or Cobb-Douglas production function with labour being the only production 
factor. As our study makes clear, the characterization of equilibrium unemployment 
is bound to be incomplete under such restrictions to the models. As we have shown, 
the interactions between labour market imperfections, product market imperfections 
and the capital intensity have important implications for the wage formation, and 
thereby for equilibrium unemployment. 
VI. Investment Decisions under Labour and Product Market 
Imperfections 
As the final part of our study we turn to briefly explore the initial stage of the 
decision-making structure, i.e. the decision whereby firms determine their capital 
stock. The capital stock is determined in the presence of rational expectations 
regarding the outcomes of the wage negotiation, the employment decisions and the 
price setting by firms. Hence, in the long run firms enter the industry with a capital 
stock, which is set to solve the following optimization problem 
{ iiiiii
K
KcLwLKRp
i
)(),(max ** +∆−−=π ,   for all i   (27) 
s.t. 0=Ωw , 0=iLiπ  and 0=ipiπ , 
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where r+=∆ 1  denotes the cost of capital. The parameter c  captures the cost of 
entering the industry in question. We assume, following Alesina et al (2003), that 
this entry cost is proportional to the capital stock .K 8 As these authors emphasize 
this entry cost could capture the effects of regulation on entry. Using the envelope 
theorem, according to which both 0=iLπ  and 0=ipπ , the first-order condition for 
the capital stock can be written in the cases of CES- and Cobb-Douglas production 
functions according to  
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π .     (28b) 
In general, the capital stock depends on the size of the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour. 
We can rewrite equation (28a) according to 
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.       (29) 
Expression (29) defines the optimal capital stock as an implicit function of the 
product and labour market imperfections. We can attach the following interpretation 
to equation (29). Lower costs of capital, i.e. more competitive capital markets, and 
lower entry costs, i.e. deregulation of entry barriers and entry-promoting competition 
policies, will decrease the total cost, defined by the RHS of (29), so that the privately 
optimal capital stock will increase. Furthermore, a higher elasticity of substitution 
between products, defined by s , will decrease ip , which will have a negative direct 
effect on the capital stock. This holds true because intensified product market 
competition will reduce the marginal product of investment, ceteris paribus. In 
                                                 
8 In their model restricted to labour as the only production factor also Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) 
endogenize product market competition by making use of an entry cost which is proportional to 
output. 
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addition, this elasticity of demand substitution, s , will also affect the capital stock 
via the term 
i
N
i
K
w
∂
∂  in a way which depends on the relationship between σ  and s  as 
characterized by Proposition 3. Hence, the impact of labour market imperfections, 
characterized by the wage setting mark-up, on the capital stock determination 
depends both on the degree of imperfections in the product markets and the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and labour. 
Denny and Nickell (1992) have empirically studied the relationship between 
investments and unions in British industries. According to their findings the rate of 
investment is about 30 % lower in firms which recognize unions relative to those in 
which unions are not recognized. Alesina et al (2003) have used OECD data to study 
how various measures of regulation in the product market, concerning in particular 
entry barriers, are related to investment behaviour. According to their findings 
product market deregulation seems to have a statistically significant negative effect 
on investment behaviour, ceteris paribus. It should however be emphasized that the 
analysis of Alesina et al abstracts from labour market frictions. 
As a special case we can investigate the optimal capital stock in the absence of 
product market imperfections, i.e. in the limiting case with ∞→s . Here both the 
price elasticity of product demand s  and entry costs c  have been postulated 
independently. But it is plausible that the entry cost will affect the number of firms 
and products negatively and thereby the price elasticity of products as well, i.e. 
)(cnn =  with 0)(' <cn  and )(nss =  with 0)(' >ns  so that .0)(' <cs  
In the case of Cobb-Douglas production function (1b) with the price setting 
equation (10b) we can rewrite the first-order condition for the capital stock (28b) as 
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This can be explicitly solved to yield  
[ ]aiaaNiai LMswacaK −−= +∆−= 11* ))(()( )1( µσ      (30) 
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According to (30) 0,
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µ  meaning that a higher interest 
rate factor and higher entry costs will decrease capital stock, while higher mark-ups 
due to less competitive product markets and higher aggregate nominal incomes will 
increase capital stock, ceteris paribus. If we assume that entry costs will affect the 
number of firms and products negatively and thereby the price elasticity of product 
as well, i.e. )(cnn =  with 0)(' <cn  and )(nss =  with 0)(' >ns  so that ,0)(' <cs  
then intensified product market competition resulting from lower entry costs will 
have on ambiguous effect on investment behaviour. More precisely, the effect 
through the wage has a positive effect via price setting (see equation (10b)) and a 
negative effect via labour demand (see equation 13b)). The negative effect dominates 
so that a higher wage rate, due to higher outside option (b) or higher relative 
bargaining power (β), will decrease the private optimal capital stock. This is because 
capital and labour are complements in the sense that their marginal products depend 
positively on the amount of the other input. 
VII. Conclusions 
The employment consequences of intensified competition and deregulation in 
product markets have been analyzed to some extent in the recent literature. However, 
in this literature the potential role of investments has been abstracted away by 
postulating a production function with labour as the only production factor either in a 
linear (see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Ebell and Haefke (2003)) or Cobb-
Douglas form (see Spector (2004)). Our starting point has been similar to these 
studies in that we have assumed imperfect competition in the product and labour 
markets, but importantly we have generalized these models by assuming a more 
general and realistic CES-type production function, in which the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour can be different from one. This has 
established a new framework for studying the interaction effects between 
imperfections in labour and product markets and long-term investments for the 
determination of equilibrium unemployment. In particular, this has made it possible 
to explore the potential determinants of equilibrium unemployment in realistic 
environments with imperfections in both product and labour markets. 
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We have shown the following new results. While a higher degree of product 
market competition, ceteris paribus, will decrease equilibrium unemployment, the 
effect of capital intensity is more complex. The capital intensity serves as a strategic 
commitment device with which the owners of the firms can affect the distribution of 
rents achieved through bargaining in imperfectly competitive labour markets. In fact, 
the negotiated wage rate decreases, and therefore also equilibrium unemployment 
declines, as a result of higher capital intensity when the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour is less than one, while the reverse happens when the 
elasticity of substitution is higher than one but smaller than the price elasticity of 
product demand. But if the elasticity of substitution is both higher than one and 
exceeds the price elasticity of product demand, the impact of capital intensity is a 
priori ambiguous. In this case the relative bargaining power of the labour unions 
turns out to play an important role in determining what combinations of the elasticity 
of substitution between production factors and the price elasticity of product demand 
make higher capital stock increase equilibrium unemployment. As a special case of 
Cobb-Douglas production function the relationship between capital stock and 
equilibrium unemployment will vanish.  
Finally, when the negotiated wage converges to the competitive rate the capital 
intensity does no longer - even in the case of CES production function - serve as a 
strategic commitment device which would affect the distribution of the rents. Thus 
once the labour market imperfections are eroded the capital intensity can no longer 
play such a strategic role. Finally, we demonstrated how labour and product market 
imperfections, characterized by the wage and price setting mark-ups, affect the 
optimal capital stock. In particular, the optimal capital stock was seen to depend both 
on the degree of imperfections in the product markets and the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour. Our new theoretical findings raise interesting 
empirical questions for future research and stress the importance of obtaining reliable 
estimates for the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital inputs. 
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 Appendix A: Derivation of product demand function 
Here we derive the demand function (5) from the basics. Let us start to look at the 
case of two products iD , 2,1=i , for which we specify the following CES-utility 
function 
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where 1>s . Maximizing the utility function (A.1) with respect to iD  for i = 1,2 
subject to the budget constraint 2211 DpDpM +=  gives the following relationship 
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between demand and prices 
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. Using this and the budget constraint 
yields 2222
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ss += −  from which we can solve for 2D , and analogously .1D  
We end up with the following demand functions 
 ss ppp
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     (A.2) 
In order to derive the index of the aggregate price level associated with the utility 
function (A.1) we proceed as follows. Minimizing the expenditure of getting the 
utility level u  w.r.t. iD  , i.e. min 2211 DpDpC +=  s.t. uU ≥  , yields 
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where λ  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the utility constraint uU ≥ . 
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The expenditure function ),,( 21 uppC  in the case of two goods can now be written 
as  
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Finally, using the index of the aggregate price level P in (A.2) we end up with 
equation (4) in the text in the case of two products. It is straightforward to generalize 
this for the case of n  products. Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix B: Derivation of wage elasticity of labour demand 
By using the production function we can write the wage elasticity of labour demand 
as follows 
[ ]
P
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1),(η ,   (B.1) 
where the specification (1a) of the text implies 
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Using (B.2) and (B.3) the wage elasticity of substitution can be written as 
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Q.E.D. 
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